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COMPETITION AND PREDATION IN
THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
GUSTAVO MATHIAS ALVES PINTO*

"Sometimes the cure is worse than the disease."

Spence (1981)

1

INTRODUCTION

R

ONALD COASE once said that one of the reasons he lost
X
is interest in antitrust was the fact that, whenever prices
would fall, courts would rule that behavior as predatory pricing.2
However, developments in the field of predatory pricing theory
in the last decades show that Coase's disillusion might have been
precipitated.'
The advent of new schools of economic
thought-notably the Chicago school-radically changed the
conception of predatory pricing, claiming that such practice
would be "so rare and irrational" that antitrust law should not
bother about this type of conduct.4 Frank Easterbrook, one of
the exponents of the Chicago school, supported the no-rule
standard for predatory pricing claims, arguing that antitrust interventions in this area would probably interfere with legitimate
* Mr. Pinto has a double degree from the Law School of the University of Sao
Paulo and Business School of the Getulio Vargas Foundation. He has a Master of
Laws Degree (L.L.M.) from Harvard Law School and is currently pursuing a
Ph.D. in Law and Economics at the University of Sao Paulo. He is the former
Chief of Division of the Secretariat of Economic Law of the Department ofJustice
in Brazil and currently works at Simpson Thacher & Bartlett, LLP. The views
expressed in this article are his own and do not necessarily represent the views of
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett, LLP.
I Michael Spence, Competition, Entry and Antitrust Policy, in STRATE Y, PREDATION, AND ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 82 (Steven Salop ed., 1981).
2 Edmund W. Kitch, The Fire of Truth: A Remembrance of Law and Economics at
Chicago, 1932-1970, 26J.L. & ECON. 163, 193 (1983).
3 For an evolution of the theories on predatory pricing, see ERNEST GELLHORN
ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 164-72 (5th ed. 2004) and
Aaron S. Edlin, Stopping Above-Cost Predatory Pricing, 111 YALE L.J. 941, 953-54
(2002).
4 GELLHORN ET AL., supra note 3, at 165.
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competition, denying consumers the beneand desirable price
5
fits of low prices.

The Supreme Court has endorsed the essence of the Chicago
school theory6 in Matushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp.7 and Brooke Group, Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp.,' expressly stating that "predatory pricing schemes are
rarely tried, and even more rarely successful." 9 In fact, since
1993, when the Supreme Court ruled on the Brooke Group case,
no predatory pricing claim has prevailed before courts."0 However, even though the matter received skeptical treatment by the
Supreme Court, this has not settled the academic debate on
predatory pricing issues. On the contrary, the debate has become even more intense."
New theories on predatory pricing-not surprisingly classified
as "post-Chicago" theories-argue that predatory pricing is not
such a rare phenomenon as supported by the Chicago school.' 2
Strategic analyses conducted under a game theory prism have
shown that there is more rationality in this type of behavior than
earlier thought.' 3 Some scholars have even proposed the possibility of above-cost predatory pricing strategies, such as in cases
of incumbent monopolists with substantial advantages in com-

5 See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, PredatoryStrategies and Counterstrategies,48
U. CHI. L. REv. 263 (1981).
6 The Supreme Court has not discarded the adoption of cost based tests for
the assessment of these claims. See Edlin, supra note 3, at 954.
7 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
8 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
9 Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 589.
10Edlin, supra note 3, at 941.

11See generally Patrick Bolton et al., Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal
Policy, 88 GEo. L.J. 2239 (2000); Alvin K. Klevorick, The Current State of the Law and
Economics of Predatory Pricing,83 Am. ECON. REv. 162 (1993); Janusz A. Ordover,
Predatory Pricing,in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW
77 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
12 For a list of authors criticizing the Chicago school, see Edlin, supra note 3, at
955-56.
'3 See generally David M. Kreps & Robert Wilson, Reputation and Imperfect Information, 27J. ECON. THEORY 253 (1981); David M. Kreps et al., Rational Cooperation
in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 245 (1982); Paul
Milgrom & John Roberts, Limit Pricing and Entry Under Incomplete Information: An
EquilibriumAnalysis, 50 ECONOMETRICA 443 (1982); Paul Milgrom &John Roberts,
Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence, 27J. ECON. THEORY 280 (1982).
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parison to their competitors that lower or meet prices in response to the entrance of new companies in the market.14
The airline industry has been particularly susceptible to the
discussion of these post-Chicago theories. 5 Courts and agencies
on both sides of the Atlantic have shown an increased willingness to investigate above-cost predatory pricing claims in this industry.1 6 Therefore, this article aims at analyzing the merits of
the application of above-cost predatory pricing theory in the airline industry. To reach the central objective of this article, it is
structured as follows: Section I presents the main characteristics
that support above-cost predatory pricing claims in the airline
industry. Section II assesses the main academic positions, and
Section III analyzes these positions with empirical data. Section
IV concludes the article.
I.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY

The airline sector was deregulated in the 1970s after decades
of monopoly or oligopoly domination, together with a strong
presence of the State in the industry.17 After the deregulation,
new companies entered the market, but struggled initially to
compete with the traditional incumbent airlines.18 This scenario changed in the 1980s, when airlines started to adopt a low
14 See generally Aaron S. Edlin & Joseph Farrell, The American Airlines Case: A
Chance to Clarify PredationPolicy (2001), in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION 502 (John
E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White eds., 2004).
15 See generally Edlin, supra note 3; Edlin & Farrell, supra note 14; Einer
Elhauge, A Better Explanation For Why Pricing Above Cost Should Not Be Predatory And the Implications For How to Define Costs (Apr. 2002) (unpublished Discussion
Paper No. 360, Harvard Law School), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/
programs/olin-center/papers/pdf/360.pdf. This concern with above-cost airline predation even goes back to Baumol. See William J. Baumol, Quasi-Permanence of Price Reductions: A Policy for Prevention of Predatory Pricing,89 YALE LJ. 1,
2-3 (1979).
16 See United States v. AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1145-69 (D. Kan.
2001); Enforcement Policy Regarding Unfair Exclusionary Conduct in the Air
Transportation Industry, 63 Fed. Reg. 17,919, 17,920-22, Apr. 10, 1998;
Bundeskartellamt [Federal Cartel Office] Feb. 18, 2002, B9-144/01 (German national antitrust tribunal condemning Deutsche Lufthansa AG for reducing its
prices in an "unjustified" manner in routes where it was competing against Germania), availableat http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/wEnglisch/download/pdf/
entscheidungen/B9-144-0l-e.pdf.
17 Andrew R. Goetz, Deregulation, Competition, and Antitrust Implications in the US
Airline Industry, 10 J. TRANSP. GEOGRAPHY 1, 2-4 (2002).
18 Christian Ewald, Predatory Pricingin the Airline Industry as a Challengeto Competition Law Enforcement-An Assessment of the Current Legal Practice in the U.S. and
Germany, in COMPETITION VERSUS PREDATION IN AVIATION MARKETs-A SURVEY OF
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cost structure (low cost carriers-LCCs), with a business model
based on the offer of cheaper airfares, route networks centering
around smaller hub airports, and elimination of reserved seating as well as many servicing costs."i This business model
proved to be very successful, and the market share of the LCCs
in the American market expanded rapidly from 7.4% in 1990 to
26.9% in 2003.20
In reaction to the fast growth of LCCs, the incumbent major
carriers in the market adopted many strategies such as matching
or undercutting the prices of the new companies or expanding
capacity in the routes where the companies directly competed.
However, even though this could be considered a typical market
behavior of incumbents, having even been considered one of
the possible defenses for price discrimination claims under the
Robinson-Patman Act (matching prices) ,21 courts and governmental agencies have criticized this kind of action.22 The U.S.
Department of Transportation (DOT) tried to enact new regulations that would restrict the ability of incumbent airline companies to respond to the entrance of new companies in the
market. 23 In Germany, the Bundeskartellamt, the national antitrust tribunal, condemned Deutsche Lufthansa AG for reducing
its prices in an "unjustified" manner in routes where it was competing against Germania, a LCC.24 Similar positions can be
found in Australia (Qantas v. Virgin Blue) and Canada (Air Canada v. West Jet) .25 These documents suggest that incumbent airline companies have substantial advantages in comparison with
new companies, and therefore, price undercutting or matching
189 (Peter Forsyth et al.
eds., 2005).
19 Id. at 190.
20 Gustavo E. Bamberger & Dennis W. Carlton, Predationand the Entry and Exit
of Low-Fare Carriers, in ADVANCES IN AIRLINE ECONOMICS-COMPETITION POLICY
AND ANTITRUST 7 (Darin Lee ed., 2006).
21 Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §13(b) (2000).
22 See United States v. AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1145-69 (D. Kan.
2001); Enforcement Policy Regarding Unfair Exclusionary Conduct in the Air
Transportation Industry, 63 Fed. Reg. 17,919, 17,920-22, Apr. 10, 1998;
Bundeskartellamt [Federal Cartel Office] Feb. 18, 2002, B9-144/01, available at
http://Nvw.bundeskartellamt.de/wEnglisch/download/pdf/entscheidungen/
B9-144-0le.pdf.
23 63 Fed. Reg. at 17,920.
24 Bundeskartellamt [Federal Cartel Office] Feb. 18, 2002, B9-144/01.
EXPERIENCE IN NORTH AMERICA, EUROPE AND AUSTRALIA

25 COMPETITION VERSUS PREDATION IN AVIATION MARKETS-A SURVEY OF EXPERIENCE IN NORTH AMERICA, EUROPE, AND AUSTRALIA xviii

2005) [hereinafter

COMPETITION VERSUS PREDATION].

(Peter Forsyth et al. eds.,
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reactions would undermine the permanence of LCCs in the
market. Below are some of the main advantages cited in these
documents which are attributed to incumbent airlines and usually pointed out by courts, agencies, and scholars to criticize
above-cost reactive discounts:
* Hub-and-Spoke: Most of the major carriers in the United
States and Europe have adopted the hub-and-spoke system
to organize their flight routes.26 In this system, cities with a
high density of passengers and good airport infrastructure
become regional centers for flight traffic, concentrating arrivals and departures in one main base and offering flights
with connections to passengers of the other routes that will
pass by these centers. 27 Therefore, the hub system allows
companies to offer more destinations and scheduling convenience to passengers, consequently increasing the used
capacity in each plane. According to the U.S. Department
ofJustice (DOJ), this creates significant advantages in terms
of income and costs to hub carriers and creates a considerable barrier to entry in the market since building a hub is
28
"difficult, time-consuming and costly.
* Slots (Landing Rights): Slots are rights allocated to an airline company to schedule a landing or departure during a
specific time period. 2 The capacity of an airport to receive
airplanes and passengers depends directly on the availability and allocation of the slots. Thus, the entrance of a new
company in a new airport and, as a result, in a new route,
will depend directly on how these rights are divided among
the airline companies."0 Because of their size and time they
have been on the market, incumbent major carriers have
most of these landing rights (in many cases the slots are
controlled by grandfather rights for the airlines that were in
26 U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., ENFORCEMENT POLICY REGARDING UNFAIR EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT IN THE AIR TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY-FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

ON THE ECONOMIC, POLICY, AND LEGAL ISSUES 19 (2001), available at http://ostpx

web.ost.dot.gov/aviation/domestic-competition/compfindings.pdf"
27 Id. at 24.
28 Memorandum of the United States at 11, United States v. AMR Corp., 140 F.
Supp. 2d 1141 (D. Kan. 2001) (No. 99-1180-JTM), available at http://www.usdoj.
gov/atr/cases/f4800/4859.htm.
- Ian Jones, Ivan Viehoff & Phillipa Marks, The Economics of Airport Slots, 14
FISCAL STUD. 37, 38 (1993).
30 U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., supra note 26, at 32; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
DOMESTIC AVIATION-BARRIERS TO ENTRY CONTINUE TO LIMIT BENEFITS OF AIRLINE
DEREGULATION 3 (1997),
available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/rc

97120t.pdf.
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place when these restrictions were added.) 31 Even though
in 1985 the DOT started allowing the negotiation of these
rights by incumbent companies in an effort to increase the
openness of the market, new entrants still struggle to get
access to these rights. 32 In a recent poll realized with man-

agers of airline companies, slots were perceived as the main
and most effective barrier to entry in the airline industry.3 3
" Gates: The leasing rules of boarding gates can also represent a barrier to entry.34 These contracts allow one company to have exclusive rights to use a gate for a long period
of time (usually twenty years) .3 Therefore, to get access to
the boarding gates, new companies must sublease them
from incumbent companies.36 Most often these subleases
are offered only for low demand periods and at considera3
bly expensive rents.

* Marketing: Marketing strategies adopted by incumbent
companies can also represent barriers to entry. 8 Among
the most important strategies are frequent flyer programs,
where airline customers accrue points corresponding to the
distance flown on an airline. These points can be redeemed for free air travel or other goods or services. In
addition, airline companies can also pay travel agents commission overrides to encourage them to book passengers
39
for a specific company flight.
" Brand: Due to the aversion of some passengers to airline
travel, the brand has an important role in the airline company choice.40 Therefore, considering its reputation in the
market, an incumbent company can attract more passenU.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 30, at 3, 10.
32 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AIRLINE COMPETITION-BARRIERS TO ENTRY
31

CONTINUE IN SOME DOMESTIC MARKETS 4-5 (1998), available at http://www.gao.
gov/archive/1998/rc98112t.pdf.
33 Mirko Schnell, Investigating Airline Managers' Perception of Route Entry Barriers:
A Questionnaire-BasedApproach, in COMPETITION VERSUS PREDATION IN AVIATION
MARKETS-A SURVEY OF EXPERIENCE IN NORTH AMERICA, EUROPE AND AUSTRALIA

259 (Peter Forsyth et al. eds., 2005).
34 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 30, at 5.
35 Id.
36

U.S.

GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,

supra note 32, at 5.

37 Id.
38 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 30, at 6.
39
40

Ewald, supra note 18, at 192.
See Edlin, supra note 3, at 943.
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gers than a new company at similar or even slightly higher
41
prices.
* Asset Mobility: Even though it is not exclusive to incumbent airlines, the mobility of its assets is a peculiar characteristic of the airline industry that facilitates strategic
predatory behavior. The airplane can be considered the ultimate mobile asset, making it very easy for incumbent companies to expand offers in reaction to new entrants.
These are some of the main characteristics usually pointed
out as advantages of incumbent major carriers in comparison
with new companies. For some scholars, these characteristics
create a substantial cost difference between companies competing in the same market, which can be used in an anticompetitive
manner.4 2 Therefore, these differences would justify the limitation of the ability of incumbent airlines to react to the entrance
of new companies in the market. The next section shows two
main academic positions on this issue.
II.

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Limit pricing or strategic deterrence models are not a recent
phenomenon. As Einer Elhauge points out, in 1977, Oliver Williamson had already proposed a prohibition for incumbents to
expand their output for a twelve- to eighteen-month period in
response to entry by new firms.4 3 In a similar fashion, in 1978,
William Baumol proposed a rule that would allow incumbents to
reduce their prices in response to entry, but would require them
to keep prices at that lower level even after the new firm had left
the market.44 More recently, Aaron Edlin defends restrictions
to above-cost reactive price cuts45-with special focus on the airline industry46-while Elhauge argues against any restrictions to
this kind of reactive price cutting.4 7 Considering that Edlin's
proposal incorporates many aspects of Williamson's and
Baumol's theories, his article, in addition to Elhauge's article,
will be used to synthesize the main aspects of both scholarly positions on the issue.
See id.
See infra Section II.
43 Elhauge, supra note 15, at 2; Oliver E. Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 284, 295-96, 333-36 (1977).
44 Baumol, supra note 15, at 4-5.
45 Edlin, supra note 3, at 955.
46 Edlin & Farrell, supra note 14, at 521.
47 Elhauge, supra note 15, at 4.
41

42
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According to Edlin, incumbents can reduce their prices, either undercutting or matching their rivals' costs, without necessarily engaging in below-cost pricing (the classic definition of
predatory pricing)."' This would be particularly true in the air-

line industry because of the substantial benefits of incumbent
companies in comparison with new entrants, as well as other factors, such as the difficulty for consumers to stockpile airline tickets.49 In this scenario, the lack of antitrust sanctions to abovecost price cuts would deter entry in the market, once any potential entrant would anticipate the incumbent's behavior.5 °
Thus, the Chicago school and the Supreme Court would be
engaging in a temporal mistake, since they would be worried
with the ex post effects of predatory pricing, where the predator
would charge supra-competitive prices to recoup its losses, when
in fact the effects should be measured ex ante, analyzing the
amount of potential entries deterred by that behavior. 51 Even if,
despite the incumbents' behavior, new companies entered the
market, any benefits derived from the price reductions would be
only temporary because, after the exit of the entrant, the incumbent would return its prices to its prior level, with the advantage
now of having built a tough competitor reputation, dissuading
even more additional potential entries.52 It is worth mentioning
that, according to Brooke Group, the mere failure to maximize
profits is not enough to configure predatory pricing.53 It is necessary to have below-cost pricing for a condemnation.5 4
As a solution to this situation, Edlin proposes a rule that
would restrict incumbents' freedom to make reactive price
cuts. 5 5 According to the rule, monopolist incumbents with sub-

stantial advantages over new entrants-such as the airline companies that dominate a particular hub-could not make reactive
price cuts or even make significant increases in product or service quality until the new company establishes itself in the market, or until its share has increased enough to make the
incumbent lose its dominant position. 5 6 For practical purposes,
48

Edlin, supra note 3, at 955.

49 Elhauge, supra note 15, at 24-25.

Edlin, supra note 3, at 945.
Id.
52 Id.
53 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209,
221-24 (1986).
50

51

54 Id.

55 Edlin, supra note 3, at 945.
56 See id.
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the author suggests a twenty percent discount as a trigger for the
rule, and an estimated time of twelve to eighteen months to allow entrants to establish themselves in the market.57
The rule would have the double benefit of creating incentives
to the entry of new companies in the market by restricting the
incumbents' pool of reaction strategies. In addition, the rule
would present the "ex ex antd' effect of lowering prices even
before any entry in the market. Incumbents would be afraid
that, if they charged higher prices and attracted new competitors, they would not be able to reduce prices in response to the
eventual entry of those new competitors.
Even though this ex ante approach may sound at first like a
silver bullet of antitrust policy, Elhauge shows that the rule does
not withstand a more thorough analysis. In fact, the first unmistakable conclusion about the proposal is that, considering that
equal or more efficient entrants could respond lucratively to any
price policy of the incumbents, the effect of the rule would be to
protect only entrants with higher costs or lower quality.58 That
is, the rule protects the less efficient entrants.
Elhauge shows that such a rule would create perverse incentives for the incumbent monopolist, as it would have interest in
losing market share as quickly as possible to recover its ability to
adjust prices.59 Obviously, the most effective and fastest way to
do that would be increasing its prices. Considering that there
are few cases of monopolists with 100% market share, it is more
likely that the rule would become unenforceable prior to the
twelve- to eighteen-month period proposed by Edlin.60 In addition, this leads to an ironic outcome, as it changes the concern
of the classic conception of predatory pricing with price reductions for a restriction that only creates incentives for increases in
price in order to maximize long-term profits.61
On the consumer side, the effects of such a rule would also be
negative. Considering that the entrant will not be able to meet
all the demand right from the beginning-if it could, the rule
would not be applied at all-there will be an unattended share
of the market left to the incumbent.6 2 As seen in the previous
section, this scenario is more common in the airline industry,
57

Id. at 946.

See Elhauge, supra note 15, at 18-19.
Id. at 20.
6 Id. at 21.
58

59

61
62

Id. at 14-18.
Id. at 22.
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where, even though there is asset mobility, the offer of new
products and services depends on access to slots and gates,
among other regulatory requisites." Therefore, the incumbent
would have an incentive to increase prices to accelerate the expiration of the rule and entrants would not grant any discounts
higher than twenty percent (trigger of the rule), even if they
were efficient enough to do so. As a result, the effect for consumers and society is harmful, as the incumbent will lose a considerable portion of its demand in the short run, but will have
incentives to maintain or even increase its previous price policy,
which could cause costly and disruptive layoffs, contractual
breaches, and idle capacity.
The author also shows that the ex ante effects of the Edlin rule
are unlikely to occur. 64 In the case of less efficient companies, it
is doubtful that the rule will create incentives for their entry in
the market. Sooner or later (probably sooner rather than later),
the incumbent will recover its ability to change prices, and will
be able to drive new companies out of the market. 65 This is even
more significant in the case of sectors with high sunk costs,
where it is improbable that twelve to eighteen months will be
enough to allow new entrants to recover their investment.66 In
the case of companies that might become more efficient with
time, the rule also would not create any significant additional
incentive, if the capital markets could always determine the necessary amount of capital for the new entrant to survive until it
becomes as or more efficient than the incumbent.67 Therefore,
the Edlin rule would only transfer the efficient and voluntary
financing provided by the capital markets for the mandatory financing by consumers in the form of higher prices. Finally, in
the case of more efficient companies, the rule would have even
less use, because these companies would enter the market anyway, independent of the rule.
The ex ex ante effects are also implausible because, if the incumbent predicts that it will be able to drive out the entrant of
the market, it will have incentives to increase prices in order to
accelerate the expiration of the rule. Nevertheless, if the incumbent knows that the entrant has deep pockets, or is capital-market financed, the rational decision will be to accommodate the
63

64
65

66
67

See supra notes 26-42 and accompanying text.

Elhauge, supra note 15, at 51.
Id. at 51-52.
Id. at 52.
Id. at 56.
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entrant instead of entering a harmful and useless price war.6" In
other words, the incumbent will prefer to enter into an oligopolistic equilibrium, instead of sacrificing a present and certain
cash flow for a future and doubtful one.6" However, it is worth
mentioning that the rule will create another important ex ex
ante effect: serious doubts for companies thinking of investing in
research and development to create a new product or thinking
of enhancing an existing product in order to achieve a monopoly. In the airline industry case, the ex ex ante effects would restrict the companies' ability to offer many advantages perceived
as positive by the consumer, such as frequent daily flights, available connecting flights, and a more recognizable brand name.
According to Elhauge, this relation between the above-cost
predatory pricing theory and the airline industry would have its
roots in the frustration of some scholars with "the failure to realize the predictions of contestable market theory in the airline
industry."7 ° This sector, which used to be mentioned as a good
example of a contestable market due to the mobility of its assets,
ended up not behaving in the expected way after the deregulation.7" Considering that the contestability of the market was one
of the main underlying rationales for the reforms in the 1970s,
scholars sought-and still seek-to find possible explanations
for this phenomenon. 72 In this scenario, the above-cost predatory pricing explanation was a good fit for this gap in the theory.
However, the author claims that the true reason the contestable market theory failed in the airline industry would not be due
to anticompetitive behavior of incumbents, but for an erroneous
assumption that the relevant markets would be the individual
routes between cities, failing to incorporate the effects of the
advent of the hub-and-spoke system.73 In this system, passengers
with different itineraries are combined in the same flight, causing the distribution of prices and costs based on the network as
a whole, and not only on individual routes. 74 Thus, the price of
the airline fare from hub A to spoke B would reflect not only the
demand for that segment of the flight, but also the demand beId. at 57.
- Id.

68

70

Id. at 69.

Id. at 70.
72 See Michael E. Levine, Airline Competition in Deregulated Markets: Theoy, Firm
Strategy, and Public Policy, 4 YALEJ. REG. 393, 395, 400-01, 403-05 (1987).
73 Elhauge, supra note 15, at 70.
74 Id. at 70-71.
71
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tween spoke B and other cities.7 5 Besides that, considering that
passengers in direct flights extract more value from the network
than connecting passengers, it makes sense to charge different
prices between these two passengers to cover the considerable
expenses involved in the construction of a hub-and-spoke network, such as investment in gates, slots, fleet, maintenance, and
luggage logistics, among others.7 6
Due to these expenditures, the loss of one route can have a
significant impact for an incumbent that administers a hub-andspoke network because that route represents revenues not only
between two cities, but also to all the other cities to which connecting flights are offered.7 7 This causes a payment transfer to
other passengers that can extract less value from the service, and
a natural deviation from the optimal price relation and, consequently, a reduction in the total output in the network.7" It is
natural, therefore, that the incumbent monopolist reduces its
prices in reaction to the entry of a new company, compensating
the revenue loss in other segments of the network. 79 If the entrant is driven out of the market, the incumbent could reestablish its prior price level that maximizes output for the hub-andspoke system."0 This way, Elhauge supports that "the observed
pattern of single route entry, reactive above-cost price cuts by
hub incumbents, exit by the single route entrant, and restoration of higher prices thus can be explained by fully competitive
behavior."81
This position is also supported by Peter Forsyth et al.:
[T]he strength of the position in which incumbent [full service
airlines] find themselves should not be overestimated. Many incumbents are afraid of competition from LCCs. The latter have
lower costs, and the ability to pitch their product such that demand for it grows very rapidly. The incumbents face a dilemma-if they do not match fares they lose market share
rapidly. On the other hand, if they do match fares, they are
likely to be setting fares below costs (since the LCCs' costs are
lower than theirs) and they risk being found to have indulged in
predatory conduct. Since it is usually very difficult for them to
reduce their costs quickly, they find it difficult to choose a re75 Id. at 71.
76 Id. at 71-73.
77

Id. at 73.

78

Id.

79 Id. at
80 Id.
81 Id.
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sponse to LCC entry which is both viable in the long run and not
risking charges of predation. In this situation, it is not surprising
that many have set up their own LCC subsidiaries,
in spite of the
82
difficulties in making this work effectively.
Besides all the mentioned problems, it is necessary to point
out that the Edlin rule has serious implementation issues. In
fact, considering that the prices would be frozen, incumbents
could seek to compete by increasing the quality of their products and services. The airline companies, for example, could try
to attract customers by offering fancier meals. Would this be
considered an increase in quality by the Edlin rule? How would
this be monitored? There are also doubts regarding the beginning of the applicability of the rule. Would it be applied as of
the date the airline company announced its intention to fly a
new route or the date when the company effectively started flying? Depending on the answer, the twelve- to eighteen-month
protection might become useless. These are only some of the
practical problems that the Edlin rule poses, but does not
answer.
Finally, the rule also creates serious practical problems for the
courts. Regarding this aspect, the Canadian Antitrust Court illustrated the difficulty of the issue in a clear and precise way in the
Tele-Direct case:
[B]ecause of the absence of any criteria, the Tribunal is being
asked by the Director to place itself in the shoes of a potential
entrant with a view to assessing the credibility of the alleged
"threat" being issued by Tele-Direct by its responses to entry.
The Tribunal must determine whether the response in the initial
markets in which entry occurred was so "overwhelmingly intense"
that an entrant would be intimidated and future entry or expansion deterred. What may seem to be a response of "overwhelming intensity" to one person may not to another. It is inevitably a
highly subjective exercise. Decisions by the Tribunal restricting
competitive action on the grounds that the action is of overwhelming intensity would send a chilling message about competition 3that is, in our view, not consistent with the purpose of the
8

Act.

It is possible to observe, therefore, that besides creating negative impacts in the market, the rule also presents severe implesupra note 25, at xiv.
Dir. of Investigation & Research v. Tele-Direct, Inc., [1997] CT-94/3 290-91
(Can. Competition Tribunal), availableat http://www.ct-tc.gc.ca/cmfiles/ct-199482
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mentation problems. These factors alone would already be
sufficient to pose serious doubts regarding the effectiveness of
such rule. Nevertheless, as it will be shown in the next section,
the empirical evidence from the airline industry also corroborates the futility of the rule.
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY

III.

Encouraged by many of the arguments mentioned in the last
section, scholars have conducted empirical research on the airline industry in order to evaluate the likelihood of the existence
of predatory behavior in this market.8 4 Considering the scope
of this article, the analysis will be limited to some of the main
results found, based on the impact of these findings on the
above mentioned theories. These results are consistent with
Elhauge's position and undermine the theory that advocates the
necessity of an antitrust reaction to above-cost reactive
discounts.
Based on data from the DOT, Bamberger and Carlton have
shown that the market share of LCCs has increased significantly,
evolving from 7.4% in 1990 to 26.9% in 2003.5 This fast growth
is inconsistent with the claim that the aggressive behavior from
incumbents is an obstacle to new entrants' development in the
market. Nevertheless, it must be taken into consideration that
Southwest Airlines represents a significant portion of this evolution, accounting for 16.8% of the market in 2003.6 Considering that Southwest's data is consistently classified as an outlier, it
was calculated
and analyzed separately from the other compa7
nies' data.

One of the most interesting facts from the study was the survival rates of LCCs in the market. These are important numbers
because they directly affect one of the main reasons for the Edlin rule, which is the incapacity of the LCCs to survive in the
market without the protection of an antitrust rule. Bamberger
and Carlton demonstrate that the survival rate of these companies for origin and destination (O&D) pairs, one year after en84

See generally Bamberger & Carlton, supra note 20;

COMPETITION VERSUS PRE-

supra note 25; Andrew S. Joskow et al., Enty, Exit, and Performance in
Airline Markets, 12 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 457, 457-71; Austan Goolsbee & Chad
Syverson, How Do Incumbents Respond to the Threat of Entry? Evidence From the Major
Airlines 2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11,072, 2005).
85 Bamberger & Carlton, supra note 20, at 7.
86 Id.
DATION,

87

Id.

2009]

COMPETITION AND PREDATION

17

try, and without considering Southwest Airlines' data, is
considerably high, floating between sixty percent and ninety
percent in the 1991-2000 period, with
the exception of 1997,
88
when it marked twenty-seven percent:
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The average survival rate of the LCCs in the period was
73.8%, while the average survival rate for the major carriers in
the same period was 76.1%. s" Southwest Airlines showed the
highest survival rate in the period, having stayed in the market
for more than one year after entry in eighty-three percent of the
cases.9 ° These results show that the survival rate of these companies is not as low as Edlin suggests, and that the majority of entrants are able to stay in the market for more than one year
without the protection of the rule. It is worth remembering that
the proposed rule would afford protection only for a twelve- to
eighteen-month period.
Nevertheless, as seen in the last section, the Edlin rule would
only be applied in cases where the entry occurred in a market
dominated by an incumbent monopolist. In the airline industry, therefore, it would only be applied in cases where entry occurred in hubs dominated by a major carrier. This way, the
authors analyzed the data for O&D pairs with at least one hub
dominated by a major carrier, one year after entry (once again
excluding Southwest Airlines) :91
- Id. at 12.
89 Id.
90

Id.

91 Id.

at 15.
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It is possible to observe that even in O&D pairs with one hub
dominated by a major carrier, the survival rates for the LCCs are
still high.9 2 Consequently, it can be inferred by the information
that the practical effects of the Edlin rule are considerably
doubtful, if on average, seventy-six percent of the LCCs that
have entered a hub in the 1993-2002 period survived for one
Excluding the
year, independently of antitrust protection.
year 1997-which can be considered an outlier for statistical
purposes-the average increases to eighty-three percent.9 4
Thus, unless there is a drastic change in the industry which
forces the vast majority of the LCCs to exit the market after one
year of entry-and there is no evidence of this in the analyzed
data-the Edlin rule will be "futile." However, even though it is
futile, it will not be harmless if it creates several negative incentives for market agents, as discussed in the last section.
Regarding the pricing behavior in the airline industry, Bamberger and Carlton analyzed the reactions of the major carriers
to entry in their hubs. The authors concluded that
the evidence shows that the type of fare responses that concern
critics of "major carriers" pricing practices are relatively rare, and
also occur in response to entry and exit by major carriers. Thus,
the claim that competition in the airline industry was "chilled" in
the mid-1990s because major carriers systematically charged
predatory prices is inconsistent with the empirical evidence.9 5
92

Id.

93 Id.
94

Id.

95 Id. at 22.
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These findings are corroborated by research conducted by
other scholars. Building on the work ofJiun-Sheng Lin et al., 96
which analyzed incumbents' reaction in 889 entries in the airline industry during the 1991-1997 period, Kai Huschelrath
shows that there is no evidence that incumbents respond more
aggressively to LCCs than to other airline companies.9 7 In fact,
there is evidence that incumbents reserve their biggest price
cuts to entrants of bigger size, with higher costs. 9 8 Besides that,

the data shows that even if the entrant is forced to leave the
market, the prices do not return to the pre-entry level.99
Ashish Lall mentions the study of Ito and Lee, which analyzed
370 cases of LCC entry in hubs from 1991 to 2002.100 Of the 370
analyzed cases, only eighty-nine of them represented unsuccessful entries. 1 1 According to the study, the entrants would be
more aggressive than incumbents with regard to price discounts
and increases in capacity.10 2

In comparison with pre-entry

levels, the LCCs introduced, on average, 32.7% more capacity
and reduced prices by 49.5%. °3 The average answer of the in-

cumbents was a 4% increase in capacity and a 15.1% price reduction. 10 4 In addition, 38% of the incumbents did not alter
their capacity or prices after entry.' 0 5 In only 8% of the cases,
the incumbents added more seats than the LCCs. 11 6 Lastly, the
study also shows that the characteristics of successful entries differ from those of unsuccessful entries. 107 The incumbents' answer apparently does not influence that.0 8 In fact, the increase
96 Jiun-Sheng C. Lin et al., Determinants of Price Reactions to Entry in the U.S. Airline Industy, 41 TRANS. J. 5, 5-22 (2002).
97 Kai Huschelrath, StrategicBehaviour of Incumbents-Rationality, Welfare and Antitrust Policy, in
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eds., 2005).
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100 Harumi Ito & Darin Lee, Incumbent Responses to Lower Cost Entry: Evidence
from the U.S. Airline Industy 5 (Brown Univ., Dep't of Econ., Working Paper No.
22, 2003).
101 Ashish Lall, Predatory Pricing:Still a Rare Occurrence?, in COMPETITION VERSUS
PREDATION IN AVIATION MARKETS-A SURVEY OF EXPERIENCE IN NORTH AMERICA,
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in capacity by the incumbents is slightly inferior in cases of unsuccessful entry (3.5%), as opposed to 4.5% in cases of successful entry. 0 9 The results are supported by regressions that show
that the price and capacity of the incumbent does not have a
significant statistical effect on the probability that a LCC will exit
a hub."1
Finally, it is worth mentioning the interesting work of Mirko
Schnell, who researched the thoughts of top executives of airline companies on perceived entry barriers in the sector.'l I The
author interviewed thirty-nine managers of European airlines,
questioning them about the existence, effectiveness, and influence on their decision making process regarding barriers to enbelow a table with the main
try. 11 2 It is possible to observe
13
findings from the research:'

109 Id.
110 Id.

11 Schnell, supra note 33, at 249.
112
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Id. at 258-59.
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The data shows that, according to the airline companies, the
reaction of incumbents to entry is not considered a significant
entry barrier, as suggested by some scholars.114 The executives
do consider the price discounts from incumbents as a barrier,
but only three percent consider this an "absolutely effective"
barrier. 15 Taking into account that these reactions are a
primary foundation for the proposals of antitrust intervention in
this area, the results of the research undermine the application
of strategic behavior theory in the market and question the real
size of the alleged problem." 6 In effect, executives seem to face
these reactions as a typical market behavior which, although
creating difficulties to the entry of new companies, does not
pose an insurmountable obstacle to the entry of efficient
companies."

7

Thus, the results seem to follow Elhauge's

position, to which the incumbents' reaction "can be explained
by fully competitive behavior.""'
Finally, one last point on the issue is the evolution of the
profits of airline companies over the last years. As Elhauge puts
it, "the non-monopoly explanation is more consistent with the
empirical evidence that the airline industry has not only failed
to enjoy monopoly profits, but has been unable to sustain even a
competitive rate of return for any five-year period since
deregulation." " 9 Accordingly, Lall also shows that "[a] irlines in
the U.S., at least at the network or system level, are not earning
abnormal rates of return. Indeed average economic returns
over the period 1978-96 were close to those in commodity
industries such as steel."' 2 ° These passages are corroborated by
the recent market evolution, which shows that many major
carriers have suffered financial crises in the last years. This is
hardly consistent with theories that exalt the magnitude of
incumbents' market power, suggesting that this point deserves
to be rethought.
The mentioned studies already show that there are serious
problems with the underpinnings of Edlin's rule. The data
poses questions to the efficacy of such a rule, which, in addition
to the criticism based on the strategic rationality and the
114 See
115
116
117
118

supra Section II.

Schnell, supra note 33, at 259.
Id. at 263.
Id.
Elhauge, supra note 15, at 74.

119 Id.
120

LalI, supra note 101, at 49.
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incentives created for market agents, create an even greater
skepticism about its usefulness.
IV.

CONCLUSION

This work sought to analyze the merit of above-cost predatory
pricing claims in the airline sector. It showed some of the main
characteristics of the sector frequently mentioned to support
these claims, two divergent scholarly views, and empirical evidence supporting these views.
The review of the literature and the empirical data suggest
that, even though some major carriers might be responding to
LCC entry with output expansion or price reduction, this phenomenon does not have the scale that some scholars suggest,
nor is it per se evidence of anticompetitive behavior. On the contrary, the incumbents' reaction can be explained by competitive
behavior between airline companies.
Furthermore, the analysis shows that, even if a problem with
above-cost reactive discounts is admitted, the Edlin rule is certainly not the best way to cope with the "problem," either because there is no evidence that the rule is really necessary or
because of the negative incentives that it creates in the market.
In conclusion, the rule is nothing but a disguised proposal for
complex regulation, going against the rationale of the 1970's
reforms, which had the objective of deregulating the sector.
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